Regulation procedures on the island
Although the GPU Nuclear Corp. shoulders ultimate respon sibility for the cleanup operations, all significant procedures for the recovery must be reviewed and approved by the NRC, which maintains an office on the island. About 800 to 900 procedures or revisions of procedures ranging frona one-page memoranda to proposals of 1(M) pages or more are inspected each year by the staff. Roughly 10 percent of the submissions from GPU Nuciear are rejected, mainly because they need additional information or contain minor errors, said Bernard J. Snyder, director of the NRC program office.
Lamenting the "excessive detail in terms of the procedures, planning, and controls," Mr. Dieckamp of GPU Corp. said he believes that the NRC is "slowly coming to grips" with the fact that Unit 2 cannot be regulated like a typical operating plant.
Joseph Hendrie, the NRC chairman at the time of the accident said he thinks the program office was **an asset" to the cleanup. But he criticized the NRC regulatory procedures in general as one of the prime causes of the "inability to allow competent, technical programs to go forward." **lt*s the nature of nuclear regulation to be bound up in assort ed rules and protocols which require 30 days for this and a public hearing for that," said the former chairman, who is now at Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, N.Y. Proceedings on the environmental impact of krypton venting from the con tainment buiiding alone, he said, set thc cleanup schedule back at least a year. φ
Voluminous studies of TMI have helped the Nuclear Regulatory Commission generate an action plan to alter existing nuclear reactors
Few areas of the U.S. nuclear power business re main untouched by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com mission has also undergone change because of recommendations flowing from the investigations of that emergency. All the reviews and investigations set out to find some magic formula to explain **why TMl-2 went wrong." But the studies u.nderscored what was already known: that nuclear power operation is highly complex, and no substitute exists for a painstakingly rigorous approach to every aspect of power-plant design, construction, and operation.
Although there was a clear need to study the accident to im prove understanding of nuclear safety, even more pressing was the need to shift quickly from learning to action. Unit 2 was not alone; there were 70 plants licensed to operate in the United States and 92 more with construction permits. [Visions had to be made and safety measures implemented. To accomplish this, a single unifying document was needed-an action plan.
An obvious starting point were the reconunendations from the various investigations, numbering over a thousand. Tney were compiled and consolidated into the U.S. N'iclear Regulatory Commission's Nureg-0660, " N R C Action Plan Developed as a
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Result of the TMI Accident." The plan included ap proximately 175 discrete actions organized into several broad areas: operational safety; siting and design; emergency procedures; and NRC policy, organization, and management. Some recommendations affecting reactor safety were judged to be so imporiant thai they were implemented immediately. For example, the licensees o f reactors designed by Babcock & Wilcox Co., the builder of Three Mile Island Unit 2, were instructed by the NRC to decrease the reactors' high-pressure trip point and to increase the pressurizer pilot-operated relief-valve setting. This was done because the Three Miie Island accident indicated that reactors designed by Babcock & Wilcox were unusually sensitive to certain transient conditions in the secondary cooling system that might trigger this hardware. Though many of these actions had been completed by the time the action plan was prepared, the recommendations were included so that it would remain a com prehensive program.
In February 1980, based on its review of the initial drafts of the plan, the NRC approved a list of requirements as necessary but not sufficient for granting new operating licenses. Additional study of that list was then undertaken by the commission and the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. On May 15, 1980, after review of the last version of the action plan, the com mission approved the "Requirements for New Operating
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Lioei&sss,'' contaix^ in Nureg-O^. The stan recommended th^ this regulation af^ly to uimiks ctirr^tiy flying for an opo'i^iiig ilceii^. ^^iis § uw aoiaa pkn was ba^uiOy s ^sHK^roal -^KrosB^ii Table I. use of plant systems to controi or mitigate accidents in which the core is damaged; and increased emphasis on understanding cpe ratiunai abnormaiiiies.
In addition, the regulations call for improvements in the con> tent of training courses ajid casualty procoiures, the use of plant simulators, better controls and instrument displays in die control room, and the addition on every shift of technical advisers with engineering qualifications and other special training. Both the NRC and licensees have improved their methods of evaluating operating experience, and better auditing of day-to-day plant operation has been instructed to give continual feedback of new lessons and to develop a body of knowledge upon which to found future safety improvements.
2. Siting and design. Although Nureg-0737 primarily em phasized operational safety, it also required improved plant design. Even though there were no debilitating equipment failures during the initial sequence of events at Three Mile island, other than the relief valve that stuck open, the accident em phasized the importance of sysiem reliability. Nureg-0737 con tained requirements for assessing the reilability of some of the engineered safety features-for ex^ipie, the auxiliary feedwater, emergency-core cooling, containment isolation, and decay-heat removal. These analyses were directed toward identifying and correcting specific weaknesses in design. As a result, one require ment calls for reactor coolant-system vents to be installed, so that in any accident the noncondensable gases could be released into containment. The reason for this is that large quantities of noncondensable gases in the reactor coolant system could inhibit core cooling during naturai circulation cooling. In addition, the regulations call for upgraded post-accident sampling systems and monitors to detect the release of gases or effluents from the con tainment area.
The Three Mile Island accident made the nuclear industry realize that a severe accident, regarded as highly unlikely, couid indeed happen. As a result, Nureg-0737 included actions to aid in the management and control of sevm accidents, such as the im proved shiddins to aid a«:ess to hi^y radioactive fluid sj^stcsns, b^tcr means of sampling the reaaor coolant and containment lumosphere, an increa^ range of instrummts so rodent conditions could be monitored, and better iraining of reactor operators on the use of the currently install^ ^uipmoit during severe accidents.
3. Emergency f^anning. Reports on Three Mile Island general ly agi*^ thai ^^g«icy pianriing and pfqparedness at nuclear power plants were inadequate. When the Three Mile Island emergoicy arose, the roles of the Fedefal govemmeni and the utility were not cle^Iy denned. The F^eral government became the oi^ational force to ensure the health and safely of the pub lic. Re^arch (^nien, universities, engin^ring consultants, and a at Three Mite island during and after the accident. A(!d9tlonal safeguards were ordered to further prevent the possibility of such an accident These were to:
• Rd\^w how well the au^liiary buikSing, the nuctearfuel buikSLng, and other bulkJInga would be ventilated if an acci dent hke that at Tnree Mile Isl^ were to occur. Ferk>dically test the ventilation system. Review the consequences of radi ation pervadirn) these buikitngs. Improve renr)ote<x>ntrolled iodine filters in the auxiliary^uikiins ventuation system. « Esieousn procedures to limit acc^s to or tc ;OCK auxutai-y buikiings. · » Study processing pf C3nr\\^it\&\an u/Ataf thAt might !eaK to the'auxiliary bulkiing, nuctearfuoi ^ikiing, arid oth€ff bulkJings.
• Review the containment of highly cor^tamlnated water in side ths reactor buikJing and the ccnseGuanc^s of fiAft«in« the reactor-bulidlng floor. Also, check to see if the equipment In the buikiing wouki opsfsie at the radiation levels found at Three Mile Island. Keep track cf the cleanup of contaminated water In the "fhrm Mile Island reactor building.
• Minimize the pofentia} for common-mode failure of the am^gency steam-generator feedwater sysiem. Provide a study o? ihs consequences of complete bSS of feedwatef to th© ^ssm asftfifstofs • estimate the quantity of ur^condensable gas that v^fould be released into the reactor vessel. Consider how to handle it in cluding venting ths rssetCK--vsssoi head.
• Review the procedure for isolating the reactor buikiing. « Require test rig qualification of the pressurlier's relief vah/es and on-site testing of the bk>ck valves In them. Require !™Γ?5 tB^JuQ of !he block vstves at fun pressyf» ami full steam f ?o«? to dete* mine the numbw of operating cvcles they can undergo before faiiir. §. List all existing tests used to qual ify all valves, especiasiy safety and relief valves. Study the ad vantages and cost of buikjing and operating a valve-testing station.
• Review aiready existing emergency-systom studies to conihiVf that they cover the case ui pariiai rc;i;k)siny oi irte preu* Βϋπζβί·· reHe! valves.
• ProvWe a list of equipment that must operate under postaccident conditions. Provide descriptions of their qualiiicatk>n tests. ^ MlnL-nt^ potsntia! radiation leaks in the parts cf tha lovs/ pfee^'jre injectio-n cyctcrr; CTtd ir, th^ .-5sci0f-i>uii<iirig opi«y system, whkih are k>cated outside the reactor building. Pro vide a review of the reactor-building ck>sed*loop ventilation sydlem, in Order to avoid the Use O? the spray sysiem, which can cause highly contaminated water to be recirculated out side the reactor byild!ng= • Test the actual capacity of hydrogen recombiners. Test their btologlcal shleWIng and drain eystem and review their main tenance and storage procedures.
β Look for latent systematic faufte that might inhibit 5αfeŷ systems. Justify them or correct them.
• Reduce the frequency of activating the decay heat-removal syst^ for maintenance purposes, so as not to degrade its Int^rlty. Review the qualification of safety valves In the system. Reduce the frequency of activating the pressurizer's relief valves, so as not to degrade their Integrity. « Continue detailed analysis of NRC and EPRI reports of : ,nree Mii$ Island, especiaiiy with regard to production snd resorptton of unoondensable gas In the reactor and th« «pp!!-caiiOn of lOeS-OinKKiiant modeling.
• Enforce Inspect ton of quality assurance during operation.
• Study the advantages of periodically testing emergency plans for plant personnel and the public. Also, Electrtoite de France parttolpated In studies under taken by the "disturbancy a.nalysl5 and sun?ei}{a.nce system" group at EPRI and made available Its post-accident studies and procedure to the group.
Frsmstt^na and Electncue de France have conciudad that with present reactor designs operators can oope with nearly »\\ ρθβκ?»??» ••m»raHncy cpndiiinns. Ho uiaaliu utiaiun chWiges have been'deemed necessary, but a number of imprnvAmfints In iristryrnentatlon, oontfol-room displays, and operating procedures have been Implemented. These were to: variay of prof^ional organizations all attempted to be respon sive. Poor communications and a lack of adequate technical in formation immediately following the accident exacerbated the proulene.
These inadequaci^ resulted from the low priority that the NRC and its licensees had given to emergency planning, a poor definition of the NRC's role in emergencies, and insufficient -ifeiyn a ί;ί?π5 i^uiiri-vireisr tsmperstura r;?ccrssr ihat can measure temp^tures up to 1^*C (pitiVious i6Corcwf» oniy couid measure up to 600*0.
• Add an overprwsure Indicator that tells the operator how far from the boillns point Is the water In the reactor.
• Provide a list of valves critical to safetv systems. For every yalv«, explain the exact type cf signal transmitted and cr.syrs tnat intoTinatlon presented to operators allows them lO Iden tify each valve.
• Upgrade reactor and reactor-building instruments to handle core conditions confronted during the Three Mile Island acci dent. Describe remotely operated of mobile tools that could be used to analyze highly radioactive equipment.
• Provide a stucJy of reactor and reactor-building eirsampling systeme. Add equipment and establish procedures to safely take and analyze samples.
• Rsviw ihe operating procedures for the case when safety systems or equlpm^t fall. Review ooeratfng orocedures In normsJ, Incidental, and accidental situations. Pirovlde a list of incident and accident procedures that v^ro ne\mr actually iesied. rfopose ieais for ihem.
• Propose the elimination of spurious alanms In the control room.
• Provkie a mechanism for transmitting operational informa tion from the shift on duty to the rtext shift.
• Crests nsw opofeiing procedures to cover loss of heat sink, complete loss of steannienerator feedwater supply, and conrv
^1
rLT-'s^i of f-slte power sources). «Imjarove cors-cooHng procedures during small break, ioss= of-cce!ant accidsnte. Continue prsvicus studtes about heat exchange in the steam generators and use of the decay-heat renK)va! system.
• Improve the presentation of critical parameters to 0!>era-tors." « Prevent the pressurlzer's low-leveS signal from automa tically Initiating the high-pressure Injection system.
• Review how the screm signal affects other automatic safe ty systems. Electricltl de France reviewed and updated general operat ing rules and detailed operating procedures and promoted their consistency from one site to another. It also was restruc tured to iiTiprOVa ChdCkiny Of eQuipiTioni nlOdificaiiunS, to pro mote oblective feedback of operating experience, and to Im plement backfits at operating olants.
Defining opetatdr trsMtg and staffing
In French plants, the operators are solely responsible for operating the reactor. Since the Three Mile Island accident, however, safety engineers have been tmue available for corh suJtatton. Operaiton changes were to: • Consider creating permanent teams of specialists to help the plant superintendent in case of a crisis.
• Provide a description of the chain of command during a crisis.
• Increase operator training on simulators that moue\ Inci dental and acckiental condittons. Also, study the use of minisimulators in every plant, to simulate parts of the plant. Qiart the frequency of operator retraining on simulators.
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coordination among licensees, the NRC, and other Federal, state, and local agencies. A major step taken after the accident was President Jimmy Carter's centralization of emergency plan ning and response in a single ^ency: the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The NRC has worked to improve its emergency response through better emergency centers, better organization of on-site utility personnel for emergencies, and improvements in the emer gency plans for off-site action by a utility and state and local gov ernments.
Eariy in fiscal 1983, the commission approved Supplement 1 to Nureg-0737, aimed primsrily si ensuring a wels-designed, opera tionally oriented emergency-response capability. Supplement 1 contains five action-plan items related to emergency response: upgraded emergency operating procedures; control-room design reviews; a plant safety-parameter display system; upgraded emergency support facilities; and acquisition of meteorological daia. Tne commission has requested all licensees to propose an implementation plan and schedules for completing compliance with these items. The final completion date for Supplement I im provements has not yet been established.
Investigations of the Three Mile Island accident also criticized the worker radiation-protection programs, particulariy under ac cident conditions. Nureg-0737 includes improvements in radiation-protection plans, health-physics operations, in-plant radiation monitoring, and the habitability of control rooms, all intended to keep the exposures to workers during both normal operations and accidents as low as possible.
Most improvements already made
Nearly all the training, or software, items in Nureg-0737 and more than hair or the mechanical, or hardware, items have been completed at plants with operating reactors (Fig. I) . On the average, aboui ^ of the 132 items in the regulations are appli cable to any one licensee, and approximately 80 of the 90 items have been implemented at each plant (Table III. ImplcnicniaiiGri of sGnic Nurcg-0757 items have been delayed for many reasons. These include limited resources in the industry, long lead times in equipment procurement, efforts to make hardware modifications during scheduled refueling shutdowns, and the need for more definitive staff guidelines before implementa tion can proceed.
The industry has had difficulty implementing some items af fecting staffing-specifically, the requirement that two senior reactor operators instead of one be on duty in each coniroi room. TVpically, each plant must train or recruit a minimum of six addi tional operators to meet this rule. In the industry as a whole. 600 more licensed reactor operators are required.
Creating a stronger commission
The President's Reorganization Plan No. I of 1980 was the first major action io improve operations in Ihe i\RC. The plan strengthened the authority of the NRC chairman and the ex ecutive director for operations. The commission retained respon sibility for policy formulation, rulemaking, and orders and adjudication, while the chairman was empowered to carry out ali other commission functions.
Also in 1980, there were these operational changes in the NRC staff, among others:
• Creation of a new Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Data. This office is engaged in analyzing operational safety data asso ciated whh all NRC-licensed activities. It then disseminates the lessons of operaiing experience to all appropriate parties.
• Creation within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of a number of new elements, including a Division of Human Factors Safety. The division is concerned with s»?ch considerations as control-room design, operation procedures, operator and mana gerial competence, operator testing, and licensing criteria. ® Creation of a new Emergency Preparedness Program Office. It is made up of two units: (1) a licensing branch, to review both the emergency plans of applicants for reactor plant licenses and the evaluations by the Federal Emergency Management Agency of state and local emergency plans, and (2) a development branch, responsible for developing and evaluating !K>Hcy recommenda tions and regulatory requireoients.
In November i9S0, as part of a generai reorganization of the NRC's Office of Insf^tion and Enforcement, the emergencypreparedness function was transferred to that office and redes ignated the EHvision of Emergency Preparedness. A third unit was added to manage the NRC*s incident response operations and planning efforts.
Guarding againsi overcontrG! of industry
Concerned that the sheer volume of new requiremenis might be detracting from safety, and seeking to gain better management control of the multitude of doors through which new requiremmls went out, the commission took several steps to improve the efficiency of its regulatory program. One of these steps was the establishment of the Commiwee to Review Generic Require ments. The committee is responsible for reviewing requiremenis and recommending to the NRC*s executive director for operalions that they t^ approved or disapproved. Thus, the committee provide a single, agencywide iK)ini of control for the imposition of requirements.
The committee has been directed to develop means for con trolling the numt^r and nature of NRC requirements placed on licensees. The objectives of these controls are to eliminate unnec essary burdens on licensees, to reduce the exposures of workers to radiation when implementing some of these requirements, and to conserve NRC resources while not reducing the protection of public health and safety
The NRC is pursuing several initiatives in the human-factors area. One involves requirements for plant management and another concerns plant staffing. The Three Mile Island accident indicated a need for more thorough assessment of each utility's management structure and organization to determine if they can support the safe operation of a nuclear power plant. Actions in this area are l^ing carried out both by the NRC and by the industry-funded institute of Nuciear Power Operations.
During fiscal 1983, the NRC proposed a rule package that would require the manager on shift in a nuclear power plant to have a bachelor's degree in engineering or a related science. The aim was to provide enhanced on-shift diagnostic and response capabilities in any emergency. This proposal is being evaluated by the NRC, and industry reaction is being considered. At present, most utilities do not have managers that would qualify under the proposed rule.
The commission also started a program to develop regulations for the training and qualification of civilian nuclear-power-plant operators, supervisors, technicians, and other appropriate operating personnel. The commission is preparing a guide for the development of training programs and criteria for evaluating utility training programs. Where appropriate, this evaluation program will recognize an accreditation effort by the industry's !l. Paro&nlage cf Nureg^737 items completed, by plant Institute of Nuciear Power Operations, as well as that organiza tion's effort to develop a handbook on systematic approaches to training. The commJsi>iOn is also revising a regulatory guide that, in genera, endorses an industry standard dealing with upgraded qualification requirements for nuclear-power-plant personnel. The upgrading involves increased education and experience re quirements for many on-site positions.
Assessing the risks in advance
Prcbabilisiic dsk-ssscssmerii techniques in the field of nuciear power were not widely used by the NRC until after the Three Mile Island accident. These techniques are analyses intended to identify and deUneate the combination of events and probabil ities that, should they occur, could endanger the public. As prac ticed in the field of nuclear power, they focus on core-damage accidents, such as the Three Mile Island accident, since it is agreed they pose the greatest risk to the public.
The analysts have identified externally initiated accidents as those resulting from the following: earthquakes, intcrnaiiy ini tiated fires, floods, high winds, and "other'* causes (includihg aircraft, external fires, turbine missiles, and truck, train, and pipeline accidents).
Through methodological advances and some highly successful applications, the analysis of these accidents has matured enor mously since the first such effort-the Reactor Safety Study, or WASH-1400. The methodologies are not mature enough, how ever, to be relied upon quantitatively. Methodological develop ment is continuing; the methodology for seismic analysis, for example, has reached a stage where the insights from recent stud ies can be applied to specific pieces of hardware. As a result, some cost-effective plant mcdif.caiior.s havE reduced ihe seismic risk at one plant that was studied.
Human errors also combatted
Tilt investigaiions conducted in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident identified deficiencies in the human-factors design of control rooms. In response, the NRC has determined that licensees and applicants for operating licenses should con duct control-room design reviews to identify and correct human= engineering discrepancies. The objective is to give the controlroom operators better information to help them prevent ac cidents or cope with accidents.
Further, the NRC has determined that licensees and applicants for operating licenses should install safety-parameter display sys tems in their controi rooms. Such systems would give a concise display of critical plant variables for control-room operators so they could rapidly and reliably determine the safety status of the plant. And the NRG staff has developed guidelines for utilities to use in conducting their ccuii ol-rcom design reviews. Both safetyparameter display-system, criteria and the design-review guide lines are advisory in nature and are not NRC requirements for the industry.
By the end of 1983, plans for control-room design reviews at about two-thirds of the U.S. operating nuclear units had been submitted. A few control-room review summary reports and safety-parameter display-system analyses had also been submit ted. Installation of the display system has been completed at sev eral facilities.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is cunentiy developing a new program, the Integrated Safety Assessment Program, which aim.s to evaluate all applicable issues related to plant safety and identify cost-effeciive corrective actions. The plant-specific probabilistic safety assessment could then be used by the licensee to improve proc^ures, maintenance and training programs, evaluate operational occurrences, and optimize the design of plant improvements. The commission's staff would be able to use the documentation of the integrated safety-assessment pro gram evaluation as a basis for evaluating future regulatory re quirements for each plant.
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Band-aids and better
Hardware, instrumentation, and operations are improving on a piecemeal basis and more systematic studies are under way ,TJVItt>los.5
Before the Three Mile island accident in 1979, safety measures built into nuclear reactors and control rooms focused on improbable catastrophic accident scenarios and the weaknesses of the machine. Only minor attention was paid to the role of plant oper ators and emergency procedures. Now the focus is on lesser, more probable events and on the man~machine interface. Three Mile Island proved that a major reactor accident need not be catastrophic. For all that was wrong at Unit 2, from hard ware to management, no one was injured and only a trace of radiation was released into the atmosphere. Industry attention has since swung from the durability of concrete containment buildings to more subtle factors, such as small breaks in reactor pipes and operator training. In the wa'Ke of exhaustive studies by numerous groups, five vital areas have been improving: hard ware, control-room instrumentation, operator training, reactor Mark A. Fischetti Associate Editor maintenance, and communications within industry.
Some of the changes, particulariy reactor hard ware, are required by the Nuclear Regulatory Com= mission's Nureg-0737 [see **NRC as referee," p. 33]. Others have been initiated by industry research groups and reactor manufacturers, either at the request of utilities or at the suggestion of regulatory agencies. The result has been an improved technology; the improvements are examined in this report.
Steady improvement of hardware
In addition to the hardware improvements required through out the U.S. nuclear power industry by Nureg-0737, hardware is being maintained or upgraded on a plant-by-plant basis as flaws are detected in three areas: ruptures, leaks, and corrosion in steam-generator tubes; pipe cracks in boiiing-water reactors; and ruptures in the pressure tubes in Canadian deuterium-uranium (Candu) reactors [see *'Learning from other incidents," p. 431.
